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SYMPOSIUM
THE POST-CARBON WORLD: ADVANCES IN LEGAL
AND SOCIAL THEORY
INTRODUCTION
Gregg P. Macey†
“[I]t is technically feasible for the U.S. to reduce
[greenhouse gas] emissions 80% below 1990 levels by 2050 with
overall net greenhouse gas emissions of no more than 1080
MtCO2e, and fossil fuel combustion emissions of no more than
750 MtCO2.”1
“Based on the scientific results presented, current
barriers to [100% wind, water, and solar sources of power for
electricity, transportation, heating, cooling, and industry] are
neither technical nor economic. As such, they must be social
and political.”2
“[S]ociety has all the technologies it needs to meet [its
climate change and energy security] challenges . . . .”3
Architects of the Anthropocene at times betray an
uncanny optimism. Consider a moment during the rise of
industry in nineteenth-century Europe. Jean-Baptiste Say, the
French economist, argued that “nature placed in reserve long
before the formation of man immense provisions of fuel in coal
† Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. The author would like to thank the
participants of this symposium for their thoughtful contributions.
1 JAMESH. WILLIAMS ET AL., SUSTAINABLE DEV. SOLS. NETWORK & INST. FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEV. & INT’L RELATIONS, PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE
UNITED STATES, at xi (2014).
2 Mark Z. Jacobson et al., 100% Clean and Renewable Wind, Water, and
Sunlight (WWS) All-Sector Energy Roadmaps for the 50 United States, 8 ENERGY &
ENVTL. SCI. 2093, 2115 (2015).
3 MARILYN A. BROWN & BENJAMIN K. SOVACOOL, CLIMATE CHANGE AND
GLOBAL ENERGY SECURITY: TECHNOLOGY AND POLICYOPTIONS 3 (2011).
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mines.”4 One such fossil fuel reservoir was tucked beneath the
English countryside by a benevolent creator, aware of our bent
to “destroy more combustible materials than [we] could
reproduce.”5 The “coal fields of Durham and Northumberland”
were generously stocked—“adequate to furnish the present
annual supply for more than 1,340 years.”6 Similarly, the
atmosphere, known as a sink for steam combustion’s “noxious
gases” by the 1830s, was described as “immense,” “vast,” and
even “unlimited.”7 On the strength of these reserves, which
stretched to the depths and highest heavens, Europe marched
headlong into the Industrial Age.
The pace of development quickened in spurts. Minerals
replaced felled forests as sources of energy. Inputs for new
economic sectors (ores for tin for food processing, copper for
wires for electric power, rubber for belts for steam engines and
motor vehicles) were mined in distant lands. Global mobility
was assured through massive direct foreign investment in
petrochemical plants, pipelines, and refineries in the wake of
the Second World War.8 These energy transitions—from wood to
coal to hydrocarbons and uranium to synthetic and
unconventional fuels—allowed us to do remarkable things. We
used those energy sources to fell, till, plough, pave, raise, and plan
our cities and crops while sending untold amounts of ancient
biomass into the sky. But fossil-fueled industry, a “high-energy
metabolic system,”9 soon outpaced not only the assimilative
benevolence of atmosphere and ocean, but also our “capacity for
prediction and control.”10 By the time Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) consensus reports moved from findings of
“discernible” to “unequivocal” human-induced warming,11 we
found ourselves mired in a war against time and a vast
4 CHRISTOPHE BONNEUIL & JEAN-BAPTISTE FRESSOZ, THE SHOCK OF THE
ANTHROPOCENE 204 (2016).
5 Id.
6 Id. at 204–05.
7 Id. at 205–06.
8 MARC LINDER, PROJECTING CAPITALISM: A HISTORY OF THE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 126 (1994).
9 JÖRG FRIEDRICHS, THE FUTURE ISNOTWHAT ITUSED TO BE, at vii (2013).
10 See Sheila Jasanoff, Technologies of Humility: Citizen Participation in
Governing Science, 41 MINERVA 223, 223 (2003).
11 INTERGOVERNMENTALPANEL ONCLIMATECHANGE, IPCCSECONDASSESSMENT
CLIMATE CHANGE 1995, at 5 (1995), https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/climate-changes-1995/ipcc-2nd-
assessment/2nd-assessment-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6UJ-XMLR]; INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, at 10
(2007), https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_full_report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/M7TU-WBXR].
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machine.12 Heat waves killed tens of thousands.13 Water
shortages threatened treaties along nuclear-tipped national
borders.14 And as scientists adjusted sea level rise estimates
ever-higher,15 sunny day floods brought a cephalopod ashore in
Miami16 and an India-sized expanse of sea ice vanished under
record polar temperatures.17
Yet despite decades of lagging federal subsidy and
support for clean energy,18 and notwithstanding the distinct
challenge posed by industrial ecosystems to those who would
rework them (compared to prior, single-focus development
tasks such as the Manhattan Project or the Apollo moon shot),19
a new technological optimism surfaced through melting
permafrost. We find it in energy pathway projects, which build
different energy scenarios—high use of renewable fuel sources,
nuclear power plus carbon capture—around carbon emissions
commitments and the world’s carbon budget20 to figure out
whether we can hold global average temperature increases to
within 2ºC or even 1.5ºC by end-of-century. For example, one
such study looked at whether California could reduce carbon
emissions 80% from 1990 levels by 2050.21 It reviewed several
generic pathways: energy efficiency improvements in key
sectors, deep decarbonization of energy supply, electrification of
12 See CHARLES WEISS & WILLIAM B. BONVILLIAN, STRUCTURING AN ENERGY
TECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION 2 (2009) (“[A] program to stimulate technological innovation in
energy will need to approach the dimensions of a major military transformational effort.”).
13 Daniel Mitchell et al., Attributing Human Mortality During Extreme Heat
Waves to Anthropogenic Climate Change, 11 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 074006 (2016).
14 Michael Kugelman, Why the India-Pakistan War over Water Is So
Dangerous, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 30, 2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/30/why-
the-india-pakistan-war-over-water-is-so-dangerous-indus-waters-treaty [https://perma.
cc/VQ4J-3U33].
15 P.R. Thompson et al., Are Long Tide Gauge Records in the Wrong Place to
Measure Global Mean Sea Level Rise?, 43 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 10,403 (2016).
16 Alex Harris, Octopus in the Parking Garage Is Climate Change’s Canary in
the Coal Mine, MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 18, 2016), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/
local/community/miami-dade/miami-beach/article115688508.html [https://perma.cc/F6
PF-DYAC].
17 Sea Ice Hits Record Lows, NAT’L SNOW & ICE DATA CTR. (Dec. 6, 2016),
https://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2016/12/arctic-and-antarctic-at-record-low-levels [https://
perma.cc/6LJH-YG2D].
18 MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE END OF ENERGY: THE UNMAKING OF AMERICA’S
ENVIRONMENT, SECURITY, AND INDEPENDENCE 187 (2011).
19 WEISS&BONVILLIAN, supra note 12, at 9.
20 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:
SYNTHESIS REPORT (Rajendra K. Pachauri & Leo Meyer eds., 2014); NICHOLAS STERN,
WHY ARE WE WAITING? THE LOGIC, URGENCY, AND PROMISE OF TACKLING CLIMATE
CHANGE 286 (2015).
21 MAX WEI ET AL., LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., SCENARIOS FORMEETING
CALIFORNIA’S 2050 CLIMATE GOALS: CALIFORNIA’S CARBON CHALLENGE PHASE II VOLUME
1: NON-ELECTRICITY SECTORS ANDOVERALL SCENARIORESULTS, at iv (2014).
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heating and transportation, and biofuels.22 This and other studies
display confidence that existing or near-commercial technology
can achieve global and national carbon emissions reduction goals
within a generation.23
We should be wary of such claims, and not for the
preternatural precision they share with triumphal, early
industrial-era estimates of fuel reserves in tomes such as the
Statistical Account of the British Empire.24 As much as the
green energy transition promises an answer to the climate
crisis, we have witnessed energy transitions, their motives and
limitations, before. Energy systems do not simply switch from
wood to coal, coal to oil, “bridge fuel” to photovoltaic cell and
wind turbine. Energy sources exhibit remarkable staying
power—in fact, more coal was burned last year than ever before.25
These energy sources feed and are facilitated by technologies,
institutions, economic frameworks, and corporations, elements of
Thomas Hughes’s “technological systems” that evolve over
considerable periods of time, link physical artifacts, organizations,
resources, consumers, regulations, and other elements,26 and
“acquire momentum as they grow.”27 In the words of Dale
Jamieson, in the Anthropocene, “things, not people, are in
control.”28 Thus, while we welcome efforts to model and predict
how technologies will interact with an energy system’s “physical
deep structures,”29 we should also survey the institutions that
sustain energy systems, their durability, and the unintended
22 See id.
23 See, e.g., RISKY BUS. PROJECT, FROM RISK TO RETURN: INVESTING IN A CLEAN
ENERGY ECONOMY 20 (2016) (“Seriously addressing climate risk requires reducing carbon
emissions by at least 80 percent by 2050 in the U.S. and across all major economies. We
find that meeting this goal is both technically and economically feasible using commercial
or near-commercial technology.”); THE WHITE HOUSE, UNITED STATES MID-CENTURY
STRATEGY FOR DEEP DECARBONIZATION 16 (2016) (“While these goals are ambitious,
continued rapid clean energy technology development and deployment around the world
will create a virtuous cycle in which ambition drives down costs, in turn eliciting greater
ambition.”).
24 II J.R. MCCULLOCH, STATISTICAL ACCOUNT OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE:
EXHIBITING ITS EXTENT, PHYSICAL CAPACITIES, POPULATION, INDUSTRY, CIVIL AND
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS 4 (London, Charles Knight & Co. 1837).
25 INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, COAL MEDIUM-TERM MARKET REPORT 2016, at 3
(2016), https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/MediumTermCoal
MarketReport2016ExecutiveSummaryEnglishversion.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WHX-UDUZ].
26 Thomas P. Hughes, The Evolution of Large Technological Systems, in THE
SOCIALCONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: NEWDIRECTIONS IN THE SOCIOLOGY
ANDHISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY 51–80 (W. Bijker et al. eds., 1987).
27 DAVID J. HESS, GOODGREEN JOBS IN AGLOBAL ECONOMY 13 (2012).
28 DALE JAMIESON, REASON IN A DARK TIME: WHY THE STRUGGLE AGAINST
CLIMATE CHANGE FAILED—ANDWHAT ITMEANS FOROUR FUTURE 1 (2014).
29 See Sheila Jasanoff & Sang-Hyun Kim, Sociotechnical Imaginaries and
National Energy Policies, 22 SCI. AS CULTURE 189, 189 (2013).
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consequences that result when discrete changes fail to take
them into account.
As legal scholars interpret descriptive elements of IPCC
and other reports and move from findings of pathways projects to
normative claims of how to abandon a carbon-intensive economy,
they must grapple with sociotechnical systems at different scales,
using multiple levels of analysis and a mix of theoretical tools.
Legal scholars need to understand their political economy, path
dependence, and susceptibility to disruption in different contexts
and as the target of new social movements. The contributors to
this symposium issue of the Brooklyn Law Review are uniquely
qualified to discuss how such research can, and should, proceed.
They approach energy systems from varied disciplines, including
sociology, environmental law, science and technology studies,
energy law, and public policy. Yet the aim of this issue is not to
showcase the range of perspectives that they bring to the green
energy transition. We wish to invite collaboration across
disciplines and consider how the research questions that legal
scholars ask about the imperative to “decarbonize” state,
national, and global economies could be advanced through a
richer sense of sociotechnical systems, social movements, and
institutional change. To ignore these concerns, to—paraphrasing
symposium speaker Sheila Jasanoff—uncritically accept models,
misread technology as only material, ignore “routine practices as
repositories of power,” and erase history and time as factors that
shape development pathways is to invite unintended
consequences, widening inequality, or worse.30
Unintended consequences feature prominently in these
pages and in the history of energy transitions. One need only
consider the tax credits for “alternative fuels” that led companies
to add diesel to their production process31 and farmers to grow
crops on sensitive lands as feedstock for carbon-intensive fuels32
to appreciate what may result from a failure to consider, among
other things, the electricity markets in which renewable sources
are substituted for fossil fuels,33 the product life cycles of
alternative fuels and vehicles,34 or the “sacrifice zones” where
fuel source shifts take place and exhausted artifacts of clean
30 Sheila Jasanoff, New Modernities: Reimagining Science, Technology and
Development, 11 ENVTL. VALUES 253, 253 (2002).
31 GRAETZ, supra note 18, at 190.
32 GARY BRYNER & ROBERT J. DUFFY, INTEGRATING CLIMATE, ENERGY, AND
AIR POLLUTION POLICIES 3 (2012).
33 David B. Spence, Paradoxes of “Decarbonization”, 82 BROOK. L. REV.
447 (2017).
34 Alexandra B. Klass & Andrew Heiring, Life Cycle Analysis and
Transportation Energy, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 485 (2017).
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energy are discarded.35 David Spence explores three classes of
unintended consequences (“paradoxes”) that deep decarbonization
may prompt. Goals such as “80% reduction,” “100% renewables,”
and “no later than 2050,” driven by climate change projections,
carbon emissions budgets, and what is politically plausible, are
crudely drawn: they are not set with the trigger points of each
paradox in mind. In turn, climate change mitigation goals
threaten a host of challenging welfare effects. Each paradox
reflects a core tension in the electricity market that is a product of
federal rules, the physical nature and extent of the power grid,
relationships among fuel source complements and substitutes,
and the technologies that produce renewable energy. The
“reliability-cost” paradox is traced to decision rules that favor
reliability over cost and cost over environmental performance
and that require “just and reasonable” or “least-cost” rates and
increments of power.36 The “health paradox” is a product of the
close ties between the relative competitiveness of coal- and
natural gas-fired power plants and the co-pollutants of each
process.37 The “fairness paradox” confronts how energy
consumers—themselves increasingly producers of distributed
energy—interact with, maintain, and benefit from the power grid.38
Deep decarbonization “requires the political will to intervene in
electricity markets in ways that preempt” rules, reconsider system
reliability or impose new costs, question assumptions regarding
the environmental gains of discrete fuel sources, and frame the
tradeoffs of rapid transition in clearer terms.39
Alexandra Klass and Andrew Heiring address unintended
consequences through the evolution of life cycle analysis (LCA),
from simple product comparisons to robust consequential
methods that account for as many outcomes of a product or
process as possible throughout its extraction, manufacturing, use,
and disposal or recycling.40 LCA is a tool that can unearth
assumptions lodged in statute (e.g., the federal Renewable Fuel
Standard in the Energy Policy Act of 200541) that can privilege a
fuel source for a generation. Klass and Heiring recast U.S.
support for alternative liquid fuels (biofuels), the rise of
ethanol, and its unintended consequences—land use change and
35 Shannon Elizabeth Bell, Environmental Injustice and the Pursuit of a Post-
Carbon World: The Unintended Consequences of the Clean Air Act as a Cautionary Tale
for Solar Energy Development, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 529, 536 (2017).
36 Spence, supra note 33, at 453–55.
37 Id. at 471–74.
38 Id. at 474–78.
39 Id. at 471, 481–82.
40 Klass & Heiring, supra note 34, at 487–89.
41 Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15801–15811 (2012).
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reduced carbon sinks, new sources of air and water pollution,
lower fuel prices that increased fuel consumption, use of coal-
powered electricity and thermal energy to convert corn to fuel,
higher food and animal feed prices—as a failure of analytic
power to defeat narrowly focused, perceived benefits (including
lower vehicle emissions from ethanol) before they are codified.42
Their story, which they repeat for federal and state subsidy of
electric vehicles,43 is also one of agency attempts to “graft” an
analytic tool onto a mandate or requirement. The growth of
electric vehicle impact studies, from tailpipe to broader life cycle
analysis, shows that it is vitally important to approach complete
LCA as part of initial policy design. In addition, we need design
principles to inform Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
California Air Resources Board (CARB), and other agency LCA
work, particularly as they look beyond energy efficiency to
material and product efficiency to wring out further emissions
reductions from a product or process.44
Shannon Elizabeth Bell’s work is steeped in unintended
consequences, which she reveals through ethnographies of energy
“sacrifice zones.”45 Sylvester, Sundial, and Rawl, West Virginia
are towns and unincorporated communities that Bell links
through lived experience in the wake of amendments to federal
law.46 Coal dust covers a town, coal slurry impoundments
proliferate, and coal waste breaches underground mines
contaminating water supply as Bell points to another analytic
shortcoming: the absence of equity discourse prior to the Clean
Air Act Amendments.47 Bell’s work suggests a growing taxonomy
of unintended consequences that have yet to be applied to
community-scale impacts of the green energy transition, including
the reduced cost and increased installation of photovoltaic cells
that by 2050 will generate twenty million tons of waste
annually.48 It is part of a long tradition in social theory that began
with Robert Merton and flourished in areas such as man-made
disasters, organizational deviance, and the risk society.49 The
42 Klass & Heiring, supra note 34, at 490–93.
43 Id. at 511–27.
44 See generally Julian M. Allwood et al., Material Efficiency: Providing
Material Services with Less Material Production, 371 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y
20120496 (2013).
45 Bell, supra note 35, at 536–50.
46 Id. at 543–46.
47 Id. at 536–50; see 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2012).
48 Bell, supra note 35, at 550–56.
49 See, e.g., ULRICHBECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS ANEWMODERNITY 22 (Mark
Ritter trans., 1992); BARRY A. TURNER&NICK F. PIDGEON, MAN-MADEDISASTERS (2d ed.
1997); Diane Vaughan, Organizational Rituals of Risk and Error, in ORGANIZATIONAL
ENCOUNTERS WITH RISK 33 (Bridget Hutter & Michael Power eds., 2005); Robert K.
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article’s interplay between field research and epidemiology in
mountaintop removal counties in Central Appalachia shows the
potential for sociology to offer a more complete account of the
intermedia effects of statutes that are treated more coarsely in
legal scholarship.50 Existing tools of environmental justice
analysis, such as EPA’s Environmental Justice Screening and
Mapping Tool51 and the Council on Environmental Quality’s
Environmental Justice Guidance Under the National
Environmental Policy Act,52 fail to operate at levels of temporal,
spatial, and sociocultural specificity that Bell’s findings demand.
And there is a limited window in which to identify and contend
with community-scale effects, which raises issues of regulatory
analysis53 including some that were shared in public comments
by environmental justice communities as the Clean Power Plan
took shape.54
A second theme across these works is what may be
gained when history and time are given their rightful place in
the analysis of development pathways and legal change. Much
of Paul Pierson’s menu of how time shapes event sequences and
the social order is here, including path dependence,
intermittent conjunctures, slow-moving social processes, and
institutions that evolve and expire.55 Amy Stein’s piece begins
with a central puzzle that the decarbonization project faces: What
explains the persistence of a carbon-based economy despite clean
energy’s promise of reduced emissions, lower marginal fuel costs,
and less reliance on unsustainable or unstable fuel sources?56 This
sprawling question could be addressed in more digestible bits
such as technological persistence (which Brian Arthur attributed
to large fixed costs and economies of scale, learning effects,
network economies, and adaptive expectations) or economic or
Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, 1 AM. SOC. REV.
894 (1936).
50 See Bell, supra note 35.
51 EJSCREEN: Environmental Justice Screening and Mapping Tool, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/ejscreen [https://perma.cc/9DF9-GUAF].
52 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: GUIDANCE UNDER
THENATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (1997), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/
files/2015-02/documents/ej_guidance_nepa_ceq1297.pdf [https://perma.cc/B22A-Y7KZ].
53 See EPA, TECHNICAL GUIDANCE FOR ASSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
IN REGULATORY ANALYSIS 62–64 (2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/
2016-06/documents/ejtg_5_6_16_v5.1.pdf [https://perma.cc/V34X-HWKQ].
54 See, e.g., Center on Race, Poverty & the Environment, Climate Justice
Comment Letter on Carbon Pollution Emissions Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units (Dec. 1, 2014).
55 PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL
ANALYSIS (2004).
56 Amy L. Stein, Breaking Energy Path Dependencies, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 559,
561–62 (2017).
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political institutions (which Douglas North described as similarly
prone to increasing returns).57 The combined interactions of
technological and institutional systems in the fossil fuel economy
were described in Gregory Unruh’s “carbon lock-in” thesis,58
which Stein extends to the legal regimes that govern electricity
generation.59 Her article ties each feature of a path dependent
process to energy infrastructure, from up-front investment to
risk aversion and learning effects among lending institutions
and utilities to the economies of scale of regional transmission
organizations and adaptive expectations of energy analysts and
the electricity industry. Stein extends the analysis to the
entrenchment of legal and regulatory as opposed to physical
infrastructure, which she notes has in some ways “remained
relatively unchanged since the 1900s.”60 She does so by focusing
on institutional “logics,” which “define formal and informal
rules of behavior and guide interpretation about why certain
structures and practices exist.”61 Institutional logics are an
understudied unit of analysis in energy law and attempts to
explain its evolution: fossil fuel sectors build around multiple
logics that, according to the authors of the seminal work on the
topic, are part of a “contradictory interinstitutional system.”62
Stein teases out logics that underlie carbon lock-in, including
the regulatory compact, rules that reflect a least-cost resource
focus, and risk-aversion.63 For example, when state public
utility commissions require utilities to provide power at the
lowest cost as measured within limited time horizons, they
reject otherwise efficient innovations for the grid. These logics
govern electricity generation in ways that constrain clean
energy use, even as they pile up incompatible demands and
contradictions that set the stage for new development paths.64
57 See W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN
THE ECONOMY 112 (1994); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 98–99 (1990).
58 Gregory C. Unruh, Understanding Carbon Lock-In, 28 ENERGY POL’Y
817 (2000).
59 Stein, supra note 56, at 564.
60 Id. at 569.
61 Id. at 570 (quoting Wesley D. Sine & Robert J. David, Environmental Jolts,
Institutional Change, and the Creation of Entrepreneurial Opportunity in the US
Electric Power Industry, 32 RES. POL’Y 185, 187 (2003)).
62 See Roger Friedland & Robert Alford, Bringing Society Back In: Symbols,
Practices, and Institutional Contradictions, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 232, 240 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991);
see also PATRICIA H. THORNTON ET AL., THE INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS PERSPECTIVE: A
NEW APPROACH TO CULTURE, STRUCTURE, AND PROCESS 76–77 (2012).
63 Stein, supra note 56, at 570–82.
64 Id.
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The response of Eric Biber, Nina Kelsey, and Jonas
Meckling to an energy economy locked in fossil fuel production
is one of political feasibility and the sequencing of policy choice.
Their dynamic analysis is similar to Stein’s, growing out of an
historical-institutionalist account that builds on an increasing
returns approach to path dependence.65 Here, interest groups
and coalitions are the actors that shape the indirect effects of
policy development. Biber et al.’s research questions speak to
the feedback effects of legal tools adopted at time n, including
the feasibility of certain policies at time n+1, apart from their
optimality.66 The emphasis is not on static comparisons of the
efficiency of, say, carbon taxes and cap-and-trade regimes, but
the durability and level of entrenchment of policies (e.g., green
industrial policy, carbon pricing) that are adopted in sequence.
Stein and Biber et al. share a concern for the circumstances in
which “policy history, sequencing, and feedback processes
matter”67 in setting the stage for a clean energy transition, and
their findings may very well converge. For example, there is
considerable overlap between Stein’s suggestions for how the
law may foster path divergence from a fossil fuel economy and
the circumstances in which industrial and innovation policy—
according to Biber et al.’s review of policy sequences in over fifty
countries and subnational jurisdictions—lay the political
groundwork for carbon pricing and other forms of economic
regulation.68 Biber et al.’s project promises a rich understanding
of how political systems can evolve in the direction of carbon
pricing. They consider variables such as sources of clean energy
development that are amenable to interest group formation and
coalition building, levels of electricity market deregulation,
political structures that influence ease of enactment and
resistance to repeal, and regulatory independence.69
Emily Hammond and Jim Rossi give a third account of
carbon lock-in and delayed transition: the law’s approach to
stranded cost recovery.70 Stranded costs are “the value of a
regulated firm’s investments left shipwrecked by changing
regulatory circumstances.”71 Energy law endures a series of
65 Eric Biber, Nina Kelsey & Jonas Meckling, The Political Economy of
Decarbonization: A Research Agenda, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 605 (2017).
66 Id. at 615.
67 Id. at 618; see Stein, supra note 56.
68 Compare Stein, supra note 56, at 596–98, with Biber et al., supra note 65,
at 616–17.
69 Biber et al., supra note 65, at 615–18, 625–33.
70 Emily Hammond & Jim Rossi, Stranded Costs and Grid Decarbonization,
82 BROOK. L. REV. 645 (2017).
71 Id. at 646.
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experiments with the stranded costs of physical
infrastructure—nuclear and coal-fired power plants, natural
gas pipelines—that lock in decades of operational life. What
can we learn from these experiments and apply to a
decarbonizing electricity grid? Hammond and Rossi point to
three moments where regulators tried to mitigate the adverse
financial impacts of energy policy change: the growth of excess
nuclear power capacity as dozens of partially constructed plants
were canceled in the 1970s and early 1980s, a restructured
natural gas industry in the late 1980s that eased access and costs
for pipeline providers, and the electric power industry’s transition
to competitive markets in the 1990s that rendered certain power
plant assets less valuable.72 From these natural experiments with
stranded costs, Hammond and Rossi distill a common dynamic
where mitigating the financial impacts of stranded costs after-
the-fact distorts the cost of capital, ignores the social benefits of
energy transitions, favors old infrastructure over new entrants,
and delays change.73 Their findings are then recast as a question
for the clean energy transition: which forms of stranded cost
recovery address uncertainty in a way that reduces system-wide
costs of capital related to clean energy infrastructure?74
Hammond and Rossi offer several forms of stranded cost
recovery that target obstacles to decarbonization, limit price
signal distortion, and recognize clean energy resource attributes
that markets fail to price.
Two authors consider the green energy transition as
change that occurs within social fields. This level of analysis
differs from macro-level and single-case research of institutional
change, turning instead to the setting in which institutional
logics—rules and standards that guide action—play out. A
“field” is a “a meso-level social order where [individuals and
collectives] . . . interact with knowledge of one another under a
set of common understandings about the purposes of the field,
the relationships in the field . . . and the field’s rules.”75 In other
words, fields shape common understandings that actors draw
upon to respond to challenges. Individuals and organizations in
a field use, elaborate, and reinterpret logics, even adopting
logics from proximate fields. But fields are bound by more than
logics—as Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam point out, fields are
72 Id. at 652–59 (cost of capital is distorted through loss aversion and
compensation that conflates regulatory risk with technological and economic risk).
73 Id. at 662–63.
74 Id. at 686.
75 Neil Fligstein & Doug McAdam, Toward a General Theory of Strategic
Action Fields, 29 SOC. THEORY 1, 3 (2011).
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animated by a diffuse account of what is going on (the “terrain” of
the field that is shared by most actors), a sense of the relative
position of actors within the field (i.e., those viewed as having
more or less power), an understanding of the rules of the field
(“what tactics are possible, legitimate, and interpretable for each
of the roles in the field”), and interpretive frames that field actors
use “to make sense of what others are doing.”76 This level of
analysis helps us understand how social orders form and how
they endure periods of stability and contention.
For example, Scott Frickel, Daniela Wühr, Christine
Horne, and Meghan Kallman do not report on Title XIII of the
Energy Independence and Security Act77 (EISA) per se.78
Rather, they study the interactive “smart meter field”
encouraged by the statute, its members, patterns of relations
among them that stabilize norms, practices, and meaning, and
points of contestation and struggle within the field.79 Fligstein
and McAdam’s field theory guides the project as the smart
meter field, its participants (e.g., utilities, technology firms,
universities, regulatory agencies) and relative positions are
defined.80 This approach looks beyond legal change and gives it
context in the form of opportunities and constraints that play out
in relation within a field. Frickel et al. zero in on a crucial source
of conflict within the smart meter field in the state of Washington:
“technological visions,” or disparate understandings of the role of
smart meters in the electricity grid that reflect differences in
actor position and power in the field. These interpretive frames,
which Frickel et al. distill from semi-structured interviews,
suggest an unsettled field. Technological visions diverge: smart
meters are “a means of economic efficiency, a tool for
democratization, a machine-governed system,” and stranded bits
of a budding Internet of Things, struggling for interoperability
across platforms.81 Divergent interpretive frames contribute to
an unsettled smart meter field, which poses a challenge to
smart grid buildout in the wake of EISA’s technological
improvement mandate.
Thomas Beamish, Ryken Grattet, and Debbie Niemeier
share Frickel et al.’s concern with social fields. In prior research,
76 Id. at 4.
77 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, 42 U.S.C. §§ 17381–
17382 (2012).
78 See Scott Frickel, Daniela Wühr, Christine Horne & Meghan Elizabeth
Kallman, Field of Visions: Interorganizational Challenges to the Smart Energy
Transition in Washington State, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 693 (2017).
79 Id. at 696–701.
80 Id. at 696, 701–05.
81 Id. at 722, 706 (footnote omitted).
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Beamish looked at social fields as a locus of response to, for
example, the Guadalupe Dunes oil spill82 and clean energy
mandates.83 Here, Beamish et al. investigate a mechanism that
defines and shapes social fields: legitimation. Legitimation is a
“crucial aspect of policy design,” given that climate change
emerged when both top-down and incentive-based regulation
held shaky support among key constituents along the political
spectrum.84 The starting point again is a policy imperative—
carbon mitigation promoted by California’s climate change
initiatives AB 32 and SB 375.85 SB 375 gave the California Air
Resources Board the authority to set regional carbon reduction
targets that state Metropolitan Planning Organizations
(MPOs) pursue through land use and transportation planning.
Beamish et al. delve into one MPO’s strategies to legitimate a
regional planning approach known as “blueprinting,” an
important element of SB 375.86 Legitimation occurred through a
structural design that avoided the extremes of command
authority and neoliberal governance, MPO outreach that
cultivated the primacy of the “citizen planner,” data-driven tools
to define preferences that fostered a sense of regional consensus,
and alignment with professional standards and associations.87
The ability to decouple blueprinting’s legitimacy from its
outcomes—most critically GHG emissions reductions—explains
why California embraced a planning process that yields limited
carbon mitigation at best.
Shobita Parthasarathy also seeks to avoid abstracting
legal mandates, planning processes, and clean energy devices
from the social arrangements that shape their development,
details, and meaning. This is the theoretical realm of the
“sociotechnical system,” a research tradition that grows out of
historical and sociological accounts of technological change as
82 See, e.g., THOMAS D. BEAMISH, SILENT SPILL: THE ORGANIZATION OF AN
INDUSTRIAL CRISIS (2002).
83 See, e.g., LOREN LUTZENHISER ET AL., MARKET STRUCTURE AND ENERGY
EFFICIENCY: THE CASE OF NEW COMMERCIAL BUILDINGS, A REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA
INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY 4 (2001).
84 Thomas D. Beamish, Ryken Grattet & Debbie Niemeier, Climate Change
and Legitimate Governance: Land Use and Transportation Law and Policy in
California, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 725, 758 (2017).
85 Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 38,501–38,599 (2006); Sustainable Communities and Climate Protection Act of 2008,
2008 Cal. Stat. ch. 728, at 5065 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the CAL.
GOV’T CODE and the CAL. PUB. RES. CODE).
86 Beamish et al., supra note 84, at 727, 738–40.
87 Id. at 751–55.
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well as evolutionary economics.88 One concern among contributors
to this volume is the electricity grid in the United States. This is a
large-scale sociotechnical system that embodies “the generation
and transmission infrastructure and the legal, organizational,
and cultural practices associated with electricity production and
consumption.”89 To study its transition is to consider the co-
evolution of technology with its political, legal, and social
institutions—the scaling-up of new technological niches, the
mixing or hybridization of existing regimes, changes in the
landscape such as new forms of ownership or organizational
structures.90 This demands a multilevel perspective beyond the
focused, constructivist accounts of the uptake of artifacts that
once dominated the literature and sketch a technology’s
interpretive flexibility, social negotiation, and closure at a
microsocial scale.91
Parthasarathy embraces this work at both ends of the
spectrum, from national repertoires of traditions, norms, and
values that shape technical design details to the limits of cross-
national technology transfer and local adoption. She writes
about strategies to address both the incompatible “national
styles” of innovation and local expertise barriers involved.92 Her
article begins with the technological optimism behind hundreds
of alternative energy projects in developing countries, many of
which promise the simple swapping of one artifact, such as a
traditional biomass cookstove, for another to reduce carbon and
other forms of air pollution.93 She traces the limited success of
these transfer projects to the national styles of innovation
88 See, e.g., F.W. Geels, The Dynamics of Transitions in Socio-Technical Systems:
A Multi-Level Analysis of the Transition Pathway from Horse-Drawn Carriages to
Automobiles (1860–1930), 17 TECH. ANALYSIS&STRATEGICMGMT. 445 (2005).
89 David J. Hess, Industrial Fields and Countervailing Power: The
Transformation of Distributed Solar Energy in the United States, 23 GLOBAL ENVTL.
CHANGE 847, 847 (2013).
90 Frank W. Geels & Johan Schot, Typology of Sociotechnical Transition
Pathways, 36 RES. POL’Y 399, 400 (2007).
91 See, e.g., THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: NEW
DIRECTIONS IN THE SOCIOLOGY AND HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY (Wiebe E. Bijker et al.
eds., 1987).
92 See, e.g., Shobita Parthasarathy, Reconceptualizing Technology Transfer:
The Challenge of Shaping an International System of Genetic Testing for Breast Cancer,
in SHAPING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF RESEARCH
(David H. Guston & Daniel Sarewitz eds., 2006); Shobita Parthasarathy, Breaking the
Expertise Barrier: Understanding Activist Strategies in Science and Technology Policy
Domains, 37 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 355 (2010); Shobita Parthasarathy, Regulating Risk:
Defining Genetic Privacy in the United States and Britain, 29 SCI. TECH & HUM.
VALUES 332 (2004).
93 Shobita Parthasarathy, Grassroots Innovation Systems for the Post-Carbon
World: Promoting Economic Democracy, Environmental Sustainability, and the Public
Interest, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 761, 765–66 (2017).
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under which they were designed. Technology transfer involves
more than physical design: it is a transfer of “particular norms,
values, and ways of life.”94 Parthasarathy explains the approach
to innovation in which clean cookstoves were developed, a linear,
unidirectional process of designing new, nonobvious, standardized
objects with clear norms and values for what constitutes
innovative work and the necessity of markets to produce
innovation in the public interest.95 She contrasts this with
systems of grassroots innovation that proceed from the creation of
artifacts that are low-tech, low-cost, small-scale, and highly
adaptable to local, even individual concerns.96 The networks scout
out and identify innovations, assess their usefulness where
innovators live, engage in multiple forms of technology sharing,
and consider building new social systems to accommodate the
designs. These steps can broaden the scope of clean energy
technology adoption as they address national-level innovation
styles as well as the needs expressed by local communities.
Social movements are an important driver of the green
energy transition, from their attempts to break expertise
barriers to their role in multilevel perspectives of sociotechnical
change. Uma Outka writes about how social movements
introduce notions of social, distributive, and procedural fairness
and justice that vie for prominence during periods of transition.
For example, the environmental justice movement gathered
force as a federal framework for environmental protection took
shape last century. Now, climate justice advocates organize as
that system strains to limit carbon emissions, account for the
cumulative effects of single-media, single-pollutant damage to
global sinks as well as neighborhoods and individuals, and
protect vulnerable groups while tending to global averages such
as temperature and concentration of atmospheric carbon.97
Outka considers a range of fairness narratives that
environmental and climate justice activists promote at different
governance scales. She looks at, for example, the halting buildout
of the federal government’s use of legal and discretionary
authority in the wake of Executive Order 12898 as well as the
lack of analysis of the distribution of harms and benefits in the
run-up to cap-and-trade regimes such as those envisioned to
support the Clean Power Plan.98 Given the challenges inherent
94 Id. at 764.
95 Id. at 771–74.
96 Id. at 774–76.
97 Uma Outka, Fairness in the Low-Carbon Shift: Learning from Environmental
Justice, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 789, 789–94 (2017).
98 Id. at 795–804, 815–17.
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in “grafting” fairness principles onto an established canon of law
and the institutional barriers that result (most notably the
failure of EPA’s Office of Civil Rights to make a single formal
finding of discrimination under Title VI as of the end of 2016),99
Outka argues that time is of the essence as competing fairness
frames by utility and industry lobbyists and community-based
organizations clutter policy discourse. A key task for
policymaking in the green energy transition will be to address
fairness frames that “crowd[ ] out equity goals clarified by the
[environmental justice] movement” before new legal
infrastructure is in place.100
John Dernbach ends the issue with the context in which
law and social theory aim to steer a “profound transformation,”
one with which the United States has “little legal or regulatory
experience.”101 The logic that undergirds “deep decarbonization,”
an economy-wide, multigenerational migration of the energy,
transportation, building, industrial, agricultural, and other
sectors to near-zero net carbon emissions by mid-century, is
spelled out. The imperative has an uncertain but sobering
deadline. To achieve a greater than 50% probability of holding
global average temperature increases within 1.5°C, the world
economy must approach net zero carbon emissions by 2045-
2050.102 The amalgam of carbon budgeting, emissions target-
setting, scenario-building, backcasting, and physically realistic
modeling to bridge the “emissions gap” between national
commitments and a low-carbon future is strikingly new, with
much of the important work carried out in the last five years. In
rapid response, there are now research teams of energy,
technology, and economic analysts in sixteen countries (that
represent nearly three-fourths of the world’s carbon emissions)
that work to outline “the full extent of the transformation
required.”103 Backcasting locates an endpoint and blends
technological and structural change to address supply and
demand to meet a desired future. Its outputs read as a roadmap
for collaboration among legal and social theorists, both within
99 Talía Buford, Rare Discrimination Finding by EPA Civil-Rights Office,
CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2017/01/25/
20616/rare-discrimination-finding-epa-civil-rights-office [https://perma.cc/FU3E-443K].
100 Outka, supra note 97, at 822.
101 John C. Dernbach, Legal Pathways to Deep Decarbonization: Lessons from
California and Germany, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 825, 828, 838–39 (2017) (quoting
SUSTAINABLE DEV. SOLS. NETWORK & INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. & INT’L RELATIONS,
PATHWAYS TODEEPDECARBONIZATION: 2015REPORT 3 (2015)).
102 Id. at 833 tbl.1.
103 Id. at 841 (quoting SUSTAINABLE DEV. SOLS. NETWORK & INST. FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEV. & INT’L RELATIONS, PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION: 2015
REPORT 35 (2015)).
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and across central elements of a shifting energy system. For
example, deep decarbonization in the United States calls for
greater uptake of energy efficiency and fuel switching
technologies and systems, dramatic growth in low-carbon
electricity and biomass feedstock supply, strategies to ensure
electricity grid reliability, and commercial-scale carbon capture
and storage. Pathway projects build low-carbon scenarios from
these elements, any one of which could derail a development path.
Dernbach turns to two jurisdictions, California and Germany,
each a first mover that has begun to synch multigenerational
technical and legal paths to some effect.104 But as legal systems
rooted in near-term technological and economic feasibility strain
to achieve carbon intensity and emissions gains on a wholly new
scale, these jurisdictions already evince concerns our authors
have begun to address: framing and legitimation effects, co-
benefits and unintended consequences, dead-end policy choices
such as shale gas absent CCS that threaten degrees of policy
freedom, policy sequence effects, and the limits of technology
adoption, even in the shadow of carbon pricing. As Dernbach
explains, there is no “silver bullet,” no single legal or policy “fix”
to the climate crisis.105 Our post-Paris, post-Clean Power Plan106
warming world demands that legal and social theorists ratchet
up their own capacity for critical analysis of the energy paths
that stretch before us and those we must leave behind.
104 Id. at 844–59.
105 Id. at 872.
106 See Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, Exec. Order No.
13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16093, 16095 § 4 (Mar. 28, 2017) (“Review of the Environmental
Protection Agency’s ‘Clean Power Plan’ and Related Rules and Agency Actions”).
